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JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION—CONFUSION, CLARIFICATION AND 
CONTINUED CONSIDERATIONS: A CLOSER LOOK AT ARKANSAS’S JUDICIAL 
DISQUALIFICATION RULES IN LIGHT OF FERGUSON V. STATE. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For our legal system to achieve the justice it so demands, the public 
must have trust and confidence in our judicial system.1 And because the 
judiciary is central to the preservation of principles of justice, the responsi-
bility of maintaining the confidence of the general public is placed upon our 
judges.2 Judges are therefore expected to adhere to scrupulous rules govern-
ing their conduct, both professionally and personally, to further promote 
public confidence.3 An additional safeguard for preserving public confi-
dence is effectuated by and through the requirement of judges to perform 
their judicial duties both fairly and impartially.4 This commitment to fairness 
and impartiality is so vital to our judicial system that, when a judge’s impar-
tiality has been reasonably called into question, the Arkansas Code of Judi-
cial Conduct (“Code”) mandates that the judge must disqualify himself or 
herself from the proceeding.5 
As the rule for disqualification implies, it is not enough for justice to be 
done, but rather “justice must [also] satisfy the appearance of justice.”6 And 
while courts are generally the most trusted of the three branches of govern-
ment, the concern for potential judicial bias remains a direct threat to public 
confidence.7 Since judicial disqualification is mandatory under certain cir-
cumstances, the Code purports to provide a process for alleviating those 
 
 1. Public Trust and Confidence: Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http:// 
www.ncsc.org/Topics/Court-Community/Public-Trust-and-Confidence/Resource-Guide.aspx 
(last visited June 20, 2018). 
 2. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 1 (amended 2016). 
 3. Id. ¶ 2 (“Judges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, and avoid 
both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives. 
They should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence 
in their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.”). 
 4. Id. R. 2.2. 
 5. Id. R. 2.11. 
 6. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
 7. Gerstein Bocian Agne Strategies, Analysis of National Survey of Registered Voters, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/ 
Public%20Trust%20and%20Confidence/SoSC_2015_Survey%20Analysis.ashx. 
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lingering concerns.8 Unfortunately, the Code has not always been an effec-
tive remedy for achieving that goal.9 
The problem plaguing Arkansas’s rule regarding judicial recusal10 is 
that, although the Code mandates disqualification when the judge’s impar-
tiality has been reasonably questioned,11 Arkansas’s appellate courts seem-
ingly disregarded that mandate and instead granted judges “substantive dis-
cretion”12 in deciding their own disqualification fate.13 Perhaps some level of 
judicial discretion must be applied when determining whether or not recusal 
is mandated because the judge must first determine whether the movant has 
reasonably questioned the judge’s impartiality before the Code’s mandate to 
disqualify becomes operative.14 However, once a determination is made that 
the request for disqualification is reasonable, the decision to recuse is no 
longer discretionary; the judge must then recuse.15 The conflict between the 
mandate of the code and the absolute substantive discretion afforded to 
judges by Arkansas’s appellate courts had created such a perplexing conflict 
in Arkansas law that appellate review of a judge’s refusal to recuse was ren-
dered impractical for decades. However, in the 2016 case of Ferguson v. 
State, the Supreme Court of Arkansas took great strides to correct these in-
consistencies and breathe new life into the rules for judicial disqualifica-
tion.16 
In Ferguson, the Arkansas Supreme Court explicitly recognized the 
imperatives of the Code and delivered a decision with the force necessary to 
implicitly overrule decades of conflicting precedent that had plagued this 
 
 8. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. n.3. 
 9. See Walls v. State, 341 Ark. 787, 792, 20 S.W.3d 322, 325 (2000) (affirming a trial 
judge’s decision not to recuse despite the fact the judge made “inappropriate and ethically 
suspect” comments); Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. 161, 170–72, 871 S.W.2d 562, 566–67 
(1994) (affirming a trial judge’s decision not to recuse despite the fact the judge’s son worked 
in the prosecuting attorney’s office which created an appearance of bias). 
 10. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. n.1. The terms “recusal” and “disqualifica-
tion” are used interchangeably. Id. 
 11. Id. R. 2.11. 
 12. The phrase “substantive discretion” is used in this note to refer to a judge’s discre-
tion in deciding the substance of a recusal motion, i.e. choosing whether or not to recuse. 
Substantive discretion should not be confused with the abuse-of-discretion standard of review 
which will be discussed later in this note. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 13. See Walls, 341 Ark. at 792, 20 S.W.3d at 325 (“[T]he decision to recuse lies within 
the discretion of the judge.”); Irvin v. State, 345 Ark. 541, 549–50, 49 S.W.3d 635, 640 
(2001) (“Whether a judge has become biased to the point that he should disqualify himself is 
a matter to be confined to the conscience of the judge.”); Noland v. Noland, 326 Ark. 617, 
620, 932 S.W.2d 341, 343 (1996) (“[B]ias is a subjective matter peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the trial judge.”). 
 14. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, at 6–8, 498 S.W.3d 733, 737–38. 
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area of law.17 Not only did the Arkansas Supreme Court recognize the man-
datory requirements the Code outlines for disqualification, but it also pro-
vided fundamental guidance that had been noticeably absent in years past.18 
Also valuable to the clarification of this area of law is the concurring opin-
ion, written by former Chief Justice Brill, which defined a term found in the 
rules where no express definition had previously existed.19 For these com-
bined reasons, Ferguson is one of the most important disqualification cases 
to be decided in Arkansas since the inception of the Code. 
Part II of this note focuses on the delineation of the Code, and it expos-
es the complexity of the inconsistency between the Code and pre-Ferguson 
case law.20 Part III provides a detailed discussion of the decision delivered in 
Ferguson and its impact on the application of the Code’s rules on disqualifi-
cation post-Ferguson.21 This point also argues that weaknesses remaining in 
the procedural application of the Code deserve further inquiry and modifica-
tion in light of the Ferguson decision.22 Part IV summarizes and concludes 
this note.23 
II. BACKGROUND 
Judicial disqualification is a process guaranteed by the Arkansas Con-
stitution.24 Arkansas statutes also authorize disqualification of judges under 
certain circumstances.25 However, the Code provides the broadest method 
through which a litigant can seek judicial disqualification.26 
A. Disqualification Under the First Code 
In November 1973, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the American 
Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”) as the 
“proper standards for the Judiciary of this State.”27 Although the Model 
 
 17. Id. at 6–8, 498 S.W.3d at 737–38. 
 18. Id. at 6–7, 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 19. Id. at 9–10, 498 S.W.3d at 738–39 (Brill, C.J., concurring). 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 12 (“No Justice or Judge shall preside or participate in 
any case in which he or she might be interested in the outcome, in which any party is related 
to him or her by consanguinity or affinity within such degree as prescribed by law, or in 
which he or she may have been counsel or have presided in any inferior court.”). 
 25. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-11-108 (disqualification of state supreme court justices); 
Id. § 16-13-214 (disqualification of circuit court judges); Id. § 16-15-111 (disqualification of 
county court judges). 
 26. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (amended 2016). 
 27. In re Uniform Docketing Rule, 255 Ark. 1073 (December 24, 1973) (per curiam). 
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Code had been adopted and had been given force of law by the Arkansas 
Supreme Court, the Model Code was not formally published until 1988 as 
the “Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct” (“First Code”).28 
Canon 3(C)(1) of the First Code, titled “Disqualification,” merely sug-
gested that a judge “should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”29 Given the permissive 
nature of the rule, the First Code left the test for determining whether there 
was an appearance of impropriety to the individual judge’s own con-
science.30 
1. Cases Decided Under the “Should Disqualify” Language of the 
First Code 
The First Code’s use of the permissive term “should”31 combined with 
its subjective test for determining whether the appearance of impartiality 
was reasonably questioned32 resulted in the impartation of broad discretion-
ary authority upon judges when deciding disqualification issues.33 
Trimble v. State is illustrative of the forgiving nature of this broad dis-
cretionary standard.34 In Trimble, when a trial judge presided over a criminal 
matter where the judge’s son was employed at the prosecuting attorney’s 
office, the trial judge’s refusal to recuse was affirmed even though the ap-
pellate court agreed that “the appearance generated by the employment of a 
judge’s son at the prosecutor’s office is none too good.”35 But, as the Trim-
ble court indicated, the trial judge’s conduct had not violated the First Code 
because it merely suggested that the judge disqualify himself only after the 
judge subjectively determined that he had become biased and was unable to 
continue presiding over the trial.36 Since the judge in Trimble did not agree 
 
 28. In re Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 295 Ark. 707 (June 6, 1988) (per curiam). 
 29. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) (1988) (current version at R. 2.11 (amend-
ed 2016)) (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. Canon 2(A) cmt. ¶ 2 (current version at R. 1.2 (amended 2016)). 
 31. Id. Canon 3(C)(1) (current version at R. 2.11 (amended 2016)). 
 32. Id. Canon 2(A) cmt. ¶ 2 (current version at R. 1.2 (amended 2016)). 
 33. E.g., Roe v. Dietrick, 310 Ark. 54, 59, 835 S.W.2d 289, 292 (1992) (“The decision 
to disqualify from a case is, again, discretionary with the trial court.”); Sheridan v. State, 313 
Ark. 23, 48, 852 S.W.2d 772, 785 (1993) (“The decision to disqualify . . . is discretionary 
with a judge.”); Matthews v. State, 313 Ark. 327, 330, 854 S.W.2d 339, 341 (1993) (“The 
matter of whether to disqualify is to be determined in the sound discretion of the judge in 
question . . . .”); Korolko v. Korolko, 33 Ark. App. 194, 197, 803 S.W.2d 948, 950 (1991) 
(“[D]isqualification of a judge is discretionary with the judge himself . . . .”); Duty v. State, 
45 Ark. App. 1, 6, 871 S.W.2d 400, 403 (1994) (“[W]hether recusal is required lies within the 
judge’s conscience.”). 
 34. Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. 161, 871 S.W.2d 562 (1994). 
 35. Id. at 171-72, 871 S.W.2d at 567. 
 36. Id. 
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that his son’s employment at the prosecuting attorney’s office affected his 
ability to preside impartially over the criminal prosecution, his refusal to 
recuse was not a violation of the First Code.37 
This analysis demonstrates just how ambivalently the rules of disquali-
fication were applied under the First Code. Naturally, under such lax rules, 
matters of disqualification were left exclusively to the trial judge’s discre-
tion, leading to years of precedent supporting a broad substantive discretion-
ary authority vested in judges.38 
B. Disqualification Under the Second Code 
A revised Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct (“Second Code”) was 
adopted in 1993.39 Both the First Code and the Second Code had similar 
formatting, wherein the admonishments were labeled “Canons,” and each 
Canon adopted the American Bar Association’s explanatory “Commentary” 
section.40 However, a significant change was made from the First Code to 
the Second Code with respect to the rules for disqualification.41 Canon 
3(E)(1) of the Second Code, still titled “Disqualification,” mandated that a 
judge “shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”42 Also significant was 
the change made to the test for determining the appearance of impropriety, 
which was amended to incorporate an objective “reasonable minds” test 
instead of allowing the decision to lie within the conscience of the judges 
themselves.43 
The differences between the First and Second Codes were profound, 
changing the entire application of the rule. The purpose of these significant 
changes was to nullify the discretionary notion of recusal that the First Code 
had created by replacing the permissive term “should” with the mandatory 
directive “shall.”44 This purpose was made clear in the Preamble to the Se-
cond Code: 
 
 37. Id. at 165, 171–72, 871 S.W.2d at 564, 567. 
 38. See supra note 33. 
 39. In re Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 313 Ark. Appx. 737 (July 5, 1993) (per 
curiam). 
 40. Howard W. Brill, The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct of 2009, 2009 Ark. L. 
Notes 1, 2 (2009). 
 41. Compare ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) (1988) (suggesting that a judge 
should disqualify), with ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (1993) (mandating that a 
judge shall disqualify). 
 42. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (1993) (current version at R. 2.11 (amend-
ed 2016)) (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. Canon 2(A) cmt. ¶ 2 (current version at R. 1.2 (amended 2016)). 
 44. Id. Preamble ¶ 2 (1993) (current version at Scope ¶ 2 (amended 2016)). 
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The text of the [Code] . . . is authoritative . . . . When the text uses 
“shall” or “shall not,” it is intended to impose binding obligations the vi-
olation of which can result in disciplinary action. When “should” or 
“should not” is used, the text is intended as hortatory and as a statement 
of what is or is not appropriate conduct but not as binding rule under 
which a judge may be disciplined. When “may” is used, it denotes per-
missible discretion or, depending on the context, it refers to action that is 
not covered by specific proscriptions.
45
 
Additionally, the commentary found under the “shall” disqualify rule 
of the Second Code stated “[u]nder this rule, a judge is disqualified whenev-
er the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of 
whether any of the specific rules in [the section] apply.”46 
1. Cases Decided Under the “Shall Disqualify” Language of the Se-
cond Code 
For all intents and purposes, the changes incorporated into the Second 
Code should have rendered the prior “discretionary” case law decided under 
the First Code inapplicable to judicial recusal decisions being decided under 
the modified rules for disqualification. Unfortunately, as issues regarding 
recusal were appealed under the Second Code, the Arkansas appellate courts 
continued applying the legal analysis derived from the provisions of the 
First Code.47 
One of the first cases addressing the issue of judicial disqualification 
under the Second Code was Reel v. State.48 In Reel, the defendant moved to 
disqualify the presiding judge because the judge had been the victim of a 
similar crime for which the defendant was being charged.49 In affirming the 
trial judge’s refusal to recuse, the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged 
the “shall disqualify” language of the Second Code by and through the 
amended language comprising the then-Canon 3(E)(1).50 However, it ap-
pears as though the court simply copied and pasted a legal analysis of the 
rule from an opinion decided under the First Code.51 This “copy-and-paste” 
legal analysis was evidenced by the court’s errant identification of the for-
mer disqualification rule wherein the court stated, “Canon 3(C) provide[s] 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. Canon 3(E)(1) cmt. 1 (1993) (current version at R. 2.11 cmt. 1 (amended 2016)) 
(emphasis added). 
 47. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 48. Reel v. State, 318 Ark. 565, 886 S.W.2d 615 (1994). 
 49. Id. at 569, 886 S.W.2d at 617. 
 50. Id., 886 S.W.2d at 617. 
 51. Id., 886 S.W.2d at 617. 
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that . . . .”52 Canon 3(C), of course, is the disqualification provision found in 
the First Code,53 and it was no longer the rule in effect at the time Reel was 
decided.54 The court in Reel had already acknowledged that Canon 3(E)(1) 
of the Second Code was the rule for disqualification in effect at the time 
Reel was decided.55 Yet, instead of conducting a new legal analysis for the 
newly amended rules, the court simply pasted into its opinion the inapplica-
ble legal analysis derived from the First Code’s rules.56 Thereafter, to sup-
port its proposition that disqualification was discretionary, the court cited 
two cases that were decided under the First Code as the legal authority for 
its holding.57 
Compounding the already errant legal analysis, the Reel court then ap-
plied the First Code’s test for determining whether there was an appearance 
of impropriety when holding that the judge was “in the better position to 
determine if his recent experience would compromise his impartiality.”58 
The appropriate and modified test of the Second Code should have been 
applied by the court to impose an objective “reasonable minds” standard to 
the facts rather than allowing the presiding judge’s own conscience to pre-
vail in the determination of recusal.59 By failing to appreciate the substantial 
changes that had been made between the First and Second Codes, the deci-
sion in Reel critically undercut the purpose of the changes made by and 
through the Second Code.60 
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s flawed legal analysis of the Second 
Code was also evident in Walls v. State, where the court actually acknowl-
edged the mandatory language of the Second Code, stating that the rule 
“does provide that a judge shall disqualify,”61 but then stated, “however, we 
have held that recusal is a matter that is discretionary with the trial judge.”62 
Based on its application of prior precedent inapposite to the mandate of the 
Second Code, the court in Walls affirmed the trial judge’s decision not to 
 
 52. Id., 886 S.W.2d at 617 (emphasis added). 
 53. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) (1988). 
 54. Reel, 318 Ark. at 569, 886 S.W.2d at 617. 
 55. Id., 318 Ark. at 569, 886 S.W.2d at 617. 
 56. Id. at 569, 886 S.W.2d at 617. 
 57. Id. at 569, 886 S.W.2d at 617 (citing to Matthews v. State, 313 Ark. 327, 854 
S.W.2d 339 (1993), which discussed disqualification pursuant to Canon 3(C) of the First 
Code, and Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. 161, 871 S.W.2d 562 (1994), which also discussed 
disqualification under Canon 3(C) of the First Code). 
 58. Reel, 318 Ark. at 570, 886 S.W.2d at 618. 
 59. Compare ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(A) cmt. ¶ 2 (1993) (current version at 
R. 1.2 cmt. n.5 (amended 2016)), with ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(A) cmt. ¶ 2 (1988) 
(current version at R. 1.2 cmt. n.5 (amended 2016)). 
 60. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 61. Walls v. State, 341 Ark. 787, 792, 20 S.W.3d 322, 325 (2000). 
 62. Id. at 792, 20 S.W.3d at 325. 
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recuse despite the fact the court believed the judge made “inappropriate and 
ethically suspect” comments to the defendant during the course of his case.63 
This holding wholly defeated the purpose of the Second Code.64 
The misapplication of old case law to the amended rules of the Second 
Code continued for decades, entrenching in Arkansas law an errant holding 
that trial judges still had substantive discretion in deciding matters of recusal 
in spite of the language found in the Second Code.65 Nothing in the language 
of the Second Code either stated or implied that a trial judge had any discre-
tion whatsoever in deciding whether to recuse once the judge’s impartiality 
had reasonably been questioned.66 Regardless of the absence of any such 
authority in the Second Code, Arkansas appellate courts continued to grant 
judges precisely that vast and uninhibited substantive discretion, leaving the 
judge’s decision on matters of recusal virtually untouched on appellate re-
view.67 Because of the resultant competing standards, a judge’s decision to 
recuse was mandatory under the Second Code yet discretionary under the 
case law.68 The two were irreconcilable. 
C. Disqualification Under the Current Code 
The Code was amended a third time in 2009, but the provisions regard-
ing disqualification were not substantively changed.69 However, the original 
“Canon” was replaced with the enumerated “Rule 1.2” heading.70 Portions 
of the Code were amended a fourth time in 2016, specifically the provisions 
regarding disqualification.71 However, since the Second Code was made 
 
 63. Id., 20 S.W.3d at 325. 
 64. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Porter v. Ark. Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 374 Ark. 177, 191, 286 S.W.3d 
686, 697 (2008) (“The question of bias is generally confined to the conscience of the 
judge.”); Searcy v. Davenport, 352 Ark. 307, 313, 100 S.W.3d 711, 715 (2003) (“Whether a 
judge has become biased to the point that he should disqualify himself is a matter to be con-
fined to the conscience of the judge.”); Gates v. State, 338 Ark. 530, 544, 2 S.W.3d 40, 48 
(1999) (“The decision to recuse is within the trial court’s discretion . . . .”). 
 66. See ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (1993) (current version at R. 2.11 
(amended 2016)). 
 67. See supra note 65. 
 68. Compare ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (1993) (current version at R. 
2.11 (amended 2016)), with Porter, 374 Ark. at 191, 286 S.W.3d at 697 (“The question of 
bias is generally confined to the conscience of the judge.”); Searcy, 352 Ark. at 313, 100 
S.W.3d at 715 (“Whether a judge has become biased to the point that he should disqualify 
himself from a matter to be confined to the conscience of the judge.”); Gates, 338 Ark. at 
544, 2 S.W.3d at 48 (“The decision to recuse is within the trial court’s discretion.”). 
 69. Compare ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2009) (amended 2016), with ARK. 
CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (1993) (current version at R. 2.11 (amended 2016)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. In Re Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 2016 Ark. 470, 4 (Dec. 15, 2016). 
2017] JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 291 
 
effective in 1993, the rules regarding disqualification have remained sub-
stantively unchanged.72 The current rule, Rule 2.11, still requires that a 
judge “shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”73 Moreover, the rea-
sonable person standard still applies when determining what conduct consti-
tutes a violation of the Code.74 
1. Disqualification Cases Decided Under the Current Code: Prior to 
Ferguson 
The cases decided under the current version of the Code have been de-
cided with the same inherent quandaries as those that had been decided un-
der the Second Code.75 These inconsistencies and conflicts rendered appel-
late review impractical and fruitless.76 Unfortunately, the Code was never 
applied with the force of law it was intended to create, and throughout the 




 72. Compare ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (1993), with ARK. CODE JUD. 
CONDUCT R. 2.11 (amended 2016). 
 73. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (amended 2016). 
 74. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. n.5. 
 75. See Ahmad v. Horizon Pain, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 531, 5, 444 S.W.3d 412, 416 
(holding that a trial judge is presumed to be impartial and the burden is on the party seeking 
disqualification to prove a showing of bias or prejudice before a reversal can be achieved); 
Smith v. Hudgins, 2014 Ark. App. 150, 7, 433 S.W.3d 265, 269 (holding that the decision to 
recuse is within the discretion of the judge and that in order to reverse that decision, the mov-
ing party must show bias or prejudice on the part of the judge). 
 76. See supra note 75. 
 77. See Patterson v. R.T., 301 Ark. 400, 406–7, 784 S.W.2d 777, 781 (1990) (reversing 
a judge’s decision not to recuse because the decision was tainted by the appearance of pre-
judgment after the trial judge seemed to announce the outcome of the case before it was 
tried); Farley v. Jester, 257 Ark. 686, 693, 520 S.W.2d 200, 204 (1975) (reversing a judge’s 
decision not to recuse where the judge made statements that reasonably could have been 
understood by the movant as an implication that the testimony of an opposing witness would 
receive more consideration than the testimony of other witnesses); Riverside Marine Mfrs., 
Inc. v. Booth, 93 Ark. App. 48, 51–2, 216 S.W.3d 611, 613–14 (2005) (reversing a judge’s 
decision not to recuse where the judge had given the “appearance of having a mindset that 
could not be reconciled with the proposition that he was committed to hear all relevant, cred-
ible evidence, weighing it and arriving at a judicious result” but still applying the erroneous 
standard that “the decision to recuse is within the trial court’s discretion. . . .”). 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Ferguson Decision 
1. Relevant Facts and Procedural History 
Ferguson was accused of physically abusing one of her adopted chil-
dren.78 A juvenile dependency-neglect action was commenced, which was 
assigned to the Honorable Circuit Judge Barbara Elmore.79 Thereafter, the 
state of Arkansas charged Ferguson with second-degree domestic battery, 
alleging that Ferguson “unlawfully, feloniously with the purpose of causing 
physical injury to a family or household member he or she knows to be 
twelve (12) years of age or younger” injured one of her adopted children.80 
Judge Elmore was assigned to preside over the criminal proceeding as 
well.81 
During the course of the juvenile proceeding and approximately two 
weeks after Ferguson was criminally charged, an adjudication hearing was 
held before Judge Elmore wherein she stated from the bench: 
I find that there’s dependent neglect. I do find that the allegations have 
been substantiated by proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence. 
The child is dependent neglect. There was physical abuse of the child 




Because of those definitive statements rendered at the close of the ju-
venile adjudication hearing, Ferguson requested that Judge Elmore recuse 
from the criminal proceeding in accordance with the Code’s rules governing 
disqualification.83 Ferguson maintained that Judge Elmore’s statements, 
specifically that “[t]here was physical abuse of the child younger than six 
years of age” and that Judge Elmore “[couldn’t] see how you can find any-
thing else,” were evidence of pre-judgment and bias, or at a minimum gave 
the appearance of a bias.84 Ferguson also argued that, in addition to the cur-
rent Code mandating recusal for an appearance of bias, two of the enumerat-
 
 78. Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, 1–2, 498 S.W.3d 733, 735. 
 79. Id. at 2, 498 S.W.3d at 735. 
 80. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 735. 
 81. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 735. 
 82. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 735 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 2–3, 498 S.W.3d at 735; ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(1) (2009) 
(amended 2016).  
 84. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 2, 5, 498 S.W.3d at 735–36. 
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ed subsections found in the rule for disqualification were also applicable, 
specifically subsections (1) and (6).85 
Ferguson argued that under Rule 2.11(A)(6)(d),86 Judge Elmore was 
required to recuse because she “previously presided as the judge over the 
matter in another court.”87 She contended that because the juvenile depend-
ency-neglect and the criminal proceedings consisted of the same allegations, 
involved the same key witnesses who would provide the same testimony, 
and because the purpose of both cases was identical (“to prove that [Fergu-
son] caused physical injury to a child in her household that was younger 
than six years of age”), both proceedings were the same “matter” as con-
templated by Rule 2.11(A)(6)(d).88 Ferguson also argued that Rule 
2.11(A)(1)89 required Judge Elmore to recuse because she had developed a 
personal bias or prejudice against Ferguson.90 In addition to filing her mo-
tion for recusal, Ferguson also attempted to waive her right to a jury trial.91 
Judge Elmore denied both the recusal motion and the jury-trial waiv-
er.92 In her written opinion, Judge Elmore acknowledged that “some of the 
same testimony and evidence” would be heard in the criminal proceeding 
that had already been heard in the juvenile proceeding, but Judge Elmore 
held that the repetition of evidence was irrelevant because both cases had 
different burdens of proof.
 93 Thereafter, at the criminal jury trial, the same 
key witnesses from the juvenile proceeding testified again, and Ferguson 
was convicted of the charges against her.94 
2. The Arkansas Court of Appeals 
a. The Majority Opinion 
Ferguson appealed the denial of her recusal motion to the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals.95 In construing the application of the Code to the facts in 
Ferguson’s appeal, the court of appeals repeated the outdated rule that “a 
judge’s recusal is discretionary” and that a “substantial burden” is on the 
 
 85. Id. at 4–5, 498 S.W.3d at 736. 
 86. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(6)(d) (amended 2016). 
 87. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 4, 498 S.W.3d at 736. 
 88. Id. at 3–4, 498 S.W.3d at 735–36. 
 89. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(1) (amended 2016). 
 90. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 4–6, 498 S.W.3d at 736–37. 
 91. Id. at 3, 498 S.W.3d at 735. 
 92. Id. at 3, 498 S.W.3d at 735. 
 93. Id. at 3–4, 498 S.W.3d at 735–36. 
 94. Id. at 4, 498 S.W.3d at 736. 
 95. Ferguson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 722, 479 S.W.3d 25, rev’d 2016 Ark. 319, 498 
S.W.3d 733. 
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movant to prove the judge was not impartial.96 In a 4-3 decision, the court 
affirmed Judge Elmore’s denial, finding specifically that the juvenile de-
pendency-neglect and criminal proceedings were not the same “matter” and 
that the specific subdivisions contained within the Code’s disqualification 
provision did not require Judge Elmore to recuse.97 However, the court 
failed to address Ferguson’s underlying argument that a reasonable person 
would question Judge Elmore’s impartiality under those circumstances and 
that, pursuant to the Code, Judge Elmore was required to recuse.98 
b. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting justices pointed out that whether the cases were in fact 
the same “matter” was an issue of first impression that required clarifica-
tion.99 The dissent also highlighted the conflict between the case law cited 
by the majority as authority for affirming the trial court’s denial of the 
recusal motion and the plain language of the Code that mandated recusal.100 
The dissent posited this precise issue, “How do we square the mandatory 
language in Rule 2.11 with the ‘[a] judge’s recusal is discretionary’ caselaw 
on which the majority relies?”101 
Ultimately, the dissenting justices opined that the mandatory language 
of the Code “tips the scales in favor of recusal.”102 This was especially so 
given that the juvenile dependency-neglect proceeding was the “mirror-
image” of the criminal proceeding, and Ferguson justifiably questioned 
Judge Elmore’s impartiality under the Code’s reasonable person standard, 
which should have required Judge Elmore to recuse.103 Utilizing the dissent-
ing opinion as the basis for her request, Ferguson filed a Petition for Review 




 96. Id. at 4, 479 S.W.3d at 27. 
 97. Id. at 6, 479 S.W.3d at 28. 
 98. Id. at 13, 479 S.W.3d at 32 (Harrison, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id., 479 S.W.3d at 32. 
 100. Id. at 12–13, 479 S.W.3d at 31–2. 
 101. Ferguson, 2015 Ark. App. at 15, 479 S.W.3d at 33 (Harrison, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 11, 479 S.W.3d at 31. 
 103. Id. at 14, 479 S.W.3d at 32. 
 104. Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, at 1, 498 S.W.3d 733, 734. 
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3. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Review 
a. The Majority Opinion 
In a 4-3 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the court of 
appeals opinion affirming Judge Elmore’s decision and remanded the case 
for a new trial before a different judge.105 In reaching its determination, the 
majority focused on the plain wording of Rule 2.11(A) and provided an 
analysis of the application of that rule when a judge’s impartiality has been 
reasonably called into question.106 The court ruled that, when determining 
the reasonableness of a litigant’s questioning of the judge’s impartiality, the 
judge is required to “be mindful of the perception of bias from the litigant’s 
perspective.”107 The court also explained that the six enumerated sections 
found under Rule 2.11(A) were not an exhaustive list of the only ways in 
which a judge’s impartiality might be called into question.108 As long as the 
judge’s impartiality has been reasonably called into question, Rule 2.11(A) 
mandates disqualification.109 
Additionally, the court did not require Ferguson to make a showing of 
actual bias to achieve recusal.110 The court found relevant the comments 
Judge Elmore made from the bench while denying Ferguson’s jury-trial 
waiver wherein Judge Elmore stated, “If you don’t think that I can be impar-
tial in a bench trial, then I’ll deny your bench trial. So we’ll have a jury tri-
al.”111 This statement was sufficient proof that Ferguson had reasonably 
questioned Judge Elmore’s impartiality to such an extent that the judge did 
not believe she could serve as the fact-finder during Ferguson’s trial.112 Yet 
instead of recusing, Judge Elmore simply denied the jury-trial waiver and 
forced the case to proceed before a jury.113 For these reasons, the court re-
versed Ferguson’s conviction and found that Rule 2.11 required Judge 
Elmore to recuse.114 
 
 105. Id. at 8, 498 S.W.3d at 738. 
 106. Id. at 6–7, 498 S.W.3d at 737. The court explained that the word “shall” found in 
Rule 2.11(A) had mandatory rather than discretionary implications and once a judge’s impar-
tiality had been reasonably questioned, “the mandatory portion of Rule 2.11(A) is invoked 
and the judge is required to disqualify.” Id. at 7, 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 107. Id. at 7, 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 108. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 109. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 110. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 7, 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 111. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 112. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 113. Id. at 3, 498 S.W.3d at 735. 
 114. Id. at 8, 498 S.W.3d at 738. 
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b. The Concurring Opinion 
In his concurring opinion, former Chief Justice Howard Brill seized the 
opportunity to expound the language in Rule 2.11 and defined what would 
constitute the same “matter” to invoke mandatory recusal under Rule 
2.11(A)(6)(d).115 Because the term “matter” was not specifically defined in 
the Code, and since that particular issue had not been addressed by the Ar-
kansas appellate courts, Chief Justice Brill wrote his concurrence to fill this 
void in the Code.116 By reviewing the definitions of “matter” found in the 
Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct,117 by also reviewing the comments 
to the Rules of Professional Conduct118, and by looking to the Black’s Law 
Dictionary definition of “matter,”119 Chief Justice Brill compiled a list of 
four factors which he believed were instructive in determining whether two 
“matters” are in fact the same: (1) whether they focus on the same basic 
facts; (2) whether the specific parties are the same; (3) if the time between 
the two proceedings is brief; (4) and other similar factors between the two 
proceedings.120 In applying those factors to the facts presented in Ferguson, 
Chief Justice Brill determined that the criminal and juvenile dependency-
neglect proceedings were indeed the same “matter,” and therefore, recusal 
was mandatory.121 
c. The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Paul Danielson, Justice Rhonda Wood, and Justice Courtney 
Goodson took the same approach as the Arkansas Court of Appeals and 
clung to past precedent as proof that Judge Elmore was not required to recu-
 
 115. Id. at 8–10, 498 S.W.3d at 738–39. (Brill, C.J., concurring). 
 116. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 9, 498 S.W.3d at 738 (Brill, C.J., concurring). 
 117. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 738 (“[T]he Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct . . . defines a 
‘matter’ as ‘any judicial or other proceeding, allegation, request for a ruling or other determi-
nation, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particu-
lar matter involving a specific party or parties.’” (citing ARK. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 
1.11(e)(1)). 
 118. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 738 (“[I]n determining whether two particular matters are the 
same, the lawyer should consider the extent to which the matters involve the same basic facts, 
the same or related parties, and the time elapsed.” (citing ARK. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.11 
cmt. n.10)); Id., 498 S.W.3d at 738 (“[T]he scope of a ‘matter’ . . . depends on the facts of a 
particular situation or transaction.” (citing ARK. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.9 cmt. n.2)). 
 119. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 738 (“Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘matter’ in pertinent part as 
‘[a] subject under consideration, especially involving a dispute or litigation . . . Something 
that is to be tried or proven; an allegation forming the basis of a claim or defense.” (citing 
Matter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
 120. Id. at 9–10, 498 S.W.3d at 738–39. 
 121. Id. at 10–11, 498 S.W.3d at 739 
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se.122 Citing Owens v. State, the dissent quoted the long-held propositions 
that recusal decisions are discretionary and that the burden is on the moving 
party to prove actual bias before appellate courts are allowed to reverse 
those discretionary decisions.123 The dissenting justices also rejected the 
definition of “matter” found in the concurrence, instead concluding that 
“matter” was synonymous with “case.”124 In support of its interpretation, the 
dissent pointed to the explanation contained in the Model Code, which dis-
cussed judges being disqualified from “cases over which they preside in a 
different court.”125 The dissent also held that even if recusal was required in 
situations where a judge “presided over a different matter involving similar 
facts,” proof of an actual bias or prejudice must still be exhibited in accord-
ance with prior Arkansas precedent.126 Under these requirements, the dis-
senting justices believed that Ferguson failed to provide sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate an actual bias and, therefore, recusal was not warranted.127 
B. The Effect of Ferguson 
By no means did the Arkansas Supreme Court highlight the fact that it 
had revived the legal concept of judicial disqualification when it issued the 
Ferguson opinion; nevertheless, that is precisely what it did by overruling 
decades of conflicting precedent by implication.128 The decision in Ferguson 
is contrary to most, if not all, of the case law that had developed over the 
preceding years.129 Specifically, Ferguson overruled the precedent that the 
appellate courts had continued to rely on as authority for the proposition that 
recusal was a wholly discretionary decision left to the presiding judge.130 
 
 122. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 11, 498 S.W.3d at 739 (Danielson, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id., 498 S.W.3d at 739 (“The trial judge’s decision to not recuse from a case is a 
discretionary one and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.” (cit-
ing Owens v. State, 354 Ark. 644, 655, 128 S.W.3d 445, 451 (2003) (“[A]n abuse-of-
discretion can be shown by proving bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge.”))). 
 124. Id. at 12, 498 S.W.3d at 740 (“Rule 2.11(A)(6)(d) would require recusal only when 
the judge previously presided over the same case in another court. The most obvious example 
of this would be an appellate court judge who previously presided over the case as a trial 
judge.” (emphasis added)). 
 125. Id. at 12, 498 S.W.3d at 740 (emphasis in original). 
 126. Id. at 13, 498 S.W.3d at 740. 
 127. Id. at 14, 498 S.W.3d at 741. 
 128. A prior decision is overruled by implication when a subsequent decision is delivered 
that is contrary to the holding of a prior decision. See Nooner v. State, 2014 Ark. 296, 16–17, 
438 S.W.3d 233, 243–44; see also Oldner v. Villines, 328 Ark. 296, 303–04, 943 S.W.2d 
574, 578 (1997). 
 129. Compare Ferguson, 2016 Ark. 319, 498 S.W.3d 733, with supra notes 33, 65, and 
75, and accompanying text. 
 130. See Chancellor v. State, 14 Ark. App. 64, 66, 684 S.W.2d 831, 833 (1985) (“Dis-
qualification of a judge is discretionary with the judge himself.”); Woods v. State, 278 Ark. 
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Ferguson held instead that “[o]bviously, if a judge’s impartiality may ‘rea-
sonably’ be questioned, the mandatory portion of [the disqualification rule] 
is invoked and the judge is required to disqualify.”131 Although the Ferguson 
court found that mandatory recusal was obvious, with no deference given to 
the discretion of the trial judge, that mandate was anything but obvious dur-
ing the decades prior to Ferguson.132 
The Ferguson holding also revived the objective test for determining a 
judge’s impartiality, which turns on the perception of reasonable minds ra-
ther than the judge’s own conscience.133 For example, the holding in Fergu-
son that “circuit court[s are] to be mindful of the perception of bias from the 
litigant’s perspective”134 impliedly overrules cases such as Reel v. State, 
which held that judges were in better positions to determine whether their 
impartiality had been compromised.135 In the wake of Ferguson, cases such 
as Lofton v. State, wherein the court affirmed a judge’s refusal to recuse 
finding that the movant’s allegations of an appearance of bias were “subjec-
tive” to the movant, are now impliedly overruled because the court must 
now review the allegations from the litigant’s perspective.136 Now, under the 
Ferguson analysis, the opinion and conscience of the judge are irrelevant; it 
is the objective standard of a reasonable person that is determinative on this 
issue.137 
Also beneficial to the disqualification doctrine is former Chief Justice 
Brill’s definition of “matter” found in his concurring opinion.138 Although 
the Arkansas Supreme Court did not formally adopt Chief Justice Brill’s 
definition of “matter,” his interpretation is nevertheless instructive in deter-
mining the circumstances under which recusal could be required. Prior to 
Chief Justice Brill’s definition, no express definition had been provided for 
the legal term “matter” and the guidance that now exists in the concurring 
opinion will be instrumental for litigants seeking recusal under that precise 
provision of the disqualification Code.139 The dissenting justices disagreed 
with Chief Justice Brill’s definition and instead relied on the explanation 
 
271, 273, 644 S.W.2d 937, 939 (1983) (“Disqualification is discretionary with the judge 
himself.”). 
 131. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 7, 498 S.W.3d at 737.  
 132. Id. at 7, 498 S.W.3d at 737; see also supra notes 33, 65, and 75, and accompanying 
text. 
 133. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R.1.2 cmt.5 (amended 2016). 
 134. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 7, 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 135. Reel v. State, 318 Ark. 565, 570, 886 S.W.2d 615, 618 (1994). 
 136. Lofton v. State, 57 Ark. App. 226, 234, 944 S.W.2d 131, 135 (1997). 
 137. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 7, 498 S.W.3d at 737. 
 138. See id. at 10, 498 S.W.3d at 738–39 (Brill, C.J., concurring). 
 139. Id. at 9–10, 498 S.W.3d at 738–39. 
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section contained in the Model Code, which discussed judges being disqual-
ified from “cases over which they preside in a different court.”140 
However, the dissent’s interpretation is far too narrow. If the dissenting 
justices’ definition of “matter” were accurate, then the only time this provi-
sion of the Code would apply would be in a circumstance just like the ex-
ample provided by the dissent: where a judge presides over the exact same 
case during appellate review.141 Such a narrow interpretation excludes other 
instances in which a judge may have presided over the matter in another 
court: instances just like the one presented in Ferguson.142 Merely because 
the Model Code commented on one instance wherein the Code would pro-
hibit a judge from presiding over the matter in another court does not mean 
that the single example is the only prohibition this provision of the Code 
meant to provide.143 Chief Justice Brill’s definition of “matter” is more in-
clusive and more in line with the spirit of the Code.144 Moreover, Chief Jus-
tice Brill’s definition follows in line with the definition of “matter” found in 
rules proscribed for the conduct of attorneys.145 If the expectations of a judge 
are supposed to be higher than the expectations placed upon attorneys, it 
seems only natural that the definition of “matter” would be equivalent, if not 
more stringent for judges than the definition of a “matter” that applies to 
conduct for attorneys.146 Until a formal definition is adopted, the definition 
laid out in the concurring opinion creates meaningful guidance to litigants 
seeking recusal in similar situations. 
 
 140. Id. at 12–13, 498 S.W.3d at 740 (Danielson, J., dissenting) (quoting Ronald D. Ro-
tunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Ethics–The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Re-
sponsibility § 10.2-2.11(l) (2016) (emphasis added)) (“The ‘Explanation of Black Letter’ 
following the rule and its comments [found in the American Bar Association 2007 Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct] describes subsection (A)(6)(d) as a ‘[n]ew paragraph on judges 
sitting on cases they previously heard.’”). 
 141. Id. at 13, 498 S.W.3d at 740. 
 142. Id. at 4, 498 S.W.3d at 736. 
 143. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 10, 498 S.W.3d at 738–39 (Brill, C.J., concurring); see 
also supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 145. Ferguson, 2016 Ark. at 9, 498 S.W.3d at 738 (“[T]he Arkansas Rules of Profession-
al Conduct . . . defines ‘matter’ as ‘any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a 
ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, 
arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties.’”) (citing ARK. RULES 
PROF’L CONDUCT 1.11(e)(1))). 
 146. Id. at 10, 498 S.W.3d at 739; ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt.2 (2009). 
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C. Proposing Additional Improvements 
Reform of the rules regarding judicial disqualification is not a new 
concept.147 As the Code has continued to change, so have its procedural 
complications, hence the continued need for reform.148 The proposed chang-
es discussed herein are meant to address some of the most basic procedural 
mechanisms that, if left unchanged, would be inconsistent with the applica-
tion of law as set forth in the Ferguson opinion. This is not an exhaustive 
consideration of the issues. Instead, it is merely meant to lead to open dis-
cussion and consideration of the work that remains to be done in this area of 
law. 
1. Requiring Independent Review of Recusal Motions 
Even assuming arguendo that the procedural evolution of the disquali-
fication doctrine was not laden with conflicts and misapplications of law, it 
is still challenging to obtain a judge’s recusal because Arkansas still allows 
the challenged judge to decide the recusal motion instead of having an inde-
pendent judge provide an unbiased consideration of the issue.149 This pro-
verbial fox guarding the henhouse does little good to promote public confi-
dence in the judiciary, which was the public policy reason behind having 
rules that mandate disqualification in the first place.150 Moreover, it is a bla-
tant contradiction to the oft-quoted maxim nemo iudex in sua causa—no 
man should be judge in his own case.151 In allowing the challenged judge to 
rule on the motion for disqualification, Arkansas has created a significant 
obstacle to the preservation of fairness and confidence in the judiciary.152 If 
recusal is meant to be a mechanism for maintaining and enhancing public 
 
 147. Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Reforming Judicial Recusal Rules, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW 
(Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/judicial-recusal (providing a listing 
of various reports and publications advocating for recusal reform). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Compare ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11 (amended 2016), with Ill. Comp. Stat. 
725 § 5/114-5 (1987) (requiring a judge not named in the motion to conduct the hearing and 
decide the motion). 
 150. See ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 1 (amended 2016) (“Inherent in all the 
Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must 
respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance con-
fidence in the legal system.”). 
 151. Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartial-
ity, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 386–87 (2012). 
 152. MATTHEW MENENDEZ & DOROTHY SAMUELS, JUDICIAL RECUSAL REFORM: TOWARD 
INDEPENDENT CONSIDERATION OF DISQUALIFICATION, 4 (2016) https://www.brennancenter.org 
/sites/default/files/publications/Judicial_Recusal_Reform.pdf (discussing study findings that 
judges are prone to see themselves in the best light, view themselves as fair, and have diffi-
culty recognizing their own bias). 
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confidence in the judiciary,153 it is imperative that additional changes be 
made in this area of law to further that purpose. 
The simplest and perhaps most effective change would be to require a 
neutral judge to consider recusal motions instead of allowing the challenged 
judge to make that determination.154 This could be achieved by mandating 
that recusal motions be transferred to a county’s administrative judge or a 
special judge who would then conduct an independent review of the motion 
with no further action being taken by the challenged judge until a decision is 
rendered.155 By enacting a procedural rule such as this, litigants would have 
an assurance that the challenged judge’s own subjective opinion about him-
self or herself will have no impact on the ultimate recusal decision.156 
An assurance that the movant will receive a fair and independent re-
view of the motion for disqualification could have an immediate and posi-
tive effect on the disqualification procedures in Arkansas. Moreover, such a 
requirement would ensure that the challenged judge’s susceptibility towards 
self-preservation would not impact the requirement that the recusal motion 
be viewed from the perception of the litigant.157 Alternatively, if no changes 
are made to the procedural mechanisms of the disqualification rules, the 
appellate courts could be confronted with great difficulty in policing judges’ 
decisions not to recuse. This is especially so in attempting to determine 
whether the trial court’s subjective opinions played any role in the outcome. 
For these reasons, a bright-line procedural rule that mandates independent 
review of recusal motions should be implemented in Arkansas. 
2. Changing the Standard of Review on Appeal 
Appellate review of trial court decisions are traditionally divided into 
three basic categories: (1) “de novo” review of questions of law; (2) “clear 
error” review of questions of fact; and (3) “abuse-of-discretion” review of 
matters within the trial judge’s discretion.158 De novo review is an expansive 
form of review where the appellate court gives no deference to the lower 
court’s decisions and, instead, considers the case as if it had been brought 
 
 153. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 1 (2009) 
 154. See MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 152, at 6–17 (discussing the procedural 
safeguards that would be afforded to recusal decisions if recusal motions were subject to 
independent review). 
 155. This suggestion is based in part on the requirements for disqualification in Utah. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 63(c). 
 156. Id; MENENDEZ & SAMUELS, supra note 152, at 8. 
 157. See Utah R. Civ. P. 63(c); see also Ferguson v. State, 2016 Ark. 319, 7, 498 S.W.3d 
733, 737. 
 158. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014). 
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before the appellate court for the first time.159 Because cases reviewed under 
this standard involve the application of law to facts, courts are primarily 
concerned with determining how the law applies to the case.160 
A “clear error” or “clearly erroneous” review deals largely with ques-
tions of fact.161 Because the trial judge had the opportunity to hear the testi-
mony and consider the evidence, trial judges are given deference regarding 
those factual findings.162 The clear error standard requires the appellate court 
to have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” 
by the trial court before reversing the trial court’s deferential decision re-
garding these factual findings.163 
The most deferential standard, however, is the abuse-of-discretion 
standard, which is a “high threshold” that requires the trial court to act “im-
providently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration” before a trial 
judge’s decision will be reversed.164 Decisions that are subject to the abuse-
of-discretion standard usually involve “judgement calls” that are difficult for 
appellate courts to re-evaluate on appeal.165 
Judicial disqualification decisions have historically been reviewed un-
der the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.166 Consequently, not 
only is the procedural system set up to fail by allowing the challenged judge 
to determine the seriousness of his or her own bias, but once the procedural 
process does fail, and a denial is raised on appeal, the standard of review on 
appeal presents an even higher hurdle for litigants to overcome. 
The abuse-of-discretion standard is incongruent with the post-Ferguson 
disqualification analysis, and it should be abandoned in favor of the more 
appropriate de novo standard of review. Because of the decision handed 
down in Ferguson, the judge no longer has subjective discretion in deciding 
his or her own recusal motions, and the appellate court is not required to 
give the judge any deference when reviewing recusal decisions.167 It would 
serve a grave injustice to the disqualification doctrine if Arkansas’s appel-
late courts continued to review disqualification decisions under the abuse-
of-discretion standard post-Ferguson. If a judge refuses to recuse, an appeal 
of that denial should be reviewed objectively to ensure the mandatory call of 
 
 159. Daniel Solomon, Identifying and Understanding Standards of Review, GEO. U. L. 
CTR.: The Writing Ctr 1–2 (2013). 
 160. Id. at 2. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Accord Concrete Pipe and Prod. of Cal. Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. 
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993). 
 164. Accord Lone v. Koch, 2015 Ark. App. 373, 4, 467 S.W.3d 152, 155 (quoting Gulley 
v. State, 2012 Ark. 368, at 10, 423 S.W.3d 569, 576). 
 165. Solomon, supra note 159, at 3. 
 166. See Matthews v. State, 313 Ark. 327, 330, 854 S.W.2d 339, 341 (1993). 
 167. See supra notes 107–109. 
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the Code was appropriately applied. Logically, this type of review should 
require the courts to abandon the abuse-of-discretion standard. 
The issue presented in the appeal of a recusal motion, however, in-
volves both a question of fact and a question of law because the court must 
determine if the judge’s impartiality has been reasonably questioned, and it 
also must determine if the mandate of the Code applies.168 It can be difficult 
to determine the appropriate standard of review for mixed questions of law 
and fact.169 The Ninth Circuit established a functional test that is helpful in 
making this determination.170 If applying the rule of law to the facts of the 
case requires an “essentially factual” inquiry, then the clearly erroneous 
standard applies.171 If the issue requires consideration of legal concepts and 
the “values that animate legal principles,” then the de novo standard ap-
plies.172 
The review of a disqualification decision is not so much factually based 
as it is based in the application of law to the facts. Therefore, the more ap-
propriate standard of review appears to be the de novo review standard. 
D. Attempts at Clarification Post Ferguson 
Since Ferguson, further attempts at clarification have been made.173 
The arguments addressed in this note174 were raised before the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals in the case of In re Estate of Edens.175 In that case, the 
conflict between the Code and the case law espousing the review and appli-
cation of the Code’s rules were placed squarely before the court for review 
and clarification.176 After citing Ferguson as support of his position, the ap-
pellant argued that the Code’s use of the term “shall” created mandatory 
obligations on the trial judge, that it disposed of the requirement to prove 
actual bias, and that an objective reasonable person standard should deter-
mine whether recusal was required.177 The overarching concern, as ex-
 
 168. ARK. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11. (amended 2016). 
 169. Solomon, supra note 159, at 4. 
 170. Id. (analyzing the case of United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 
1984)). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. After substantially completing this note, I was given the opportunity to work on an 
appeal regarding judicial disqualification as a Rule XV certified student attorney alongside 
Jonathan R. Streit of Searcy, Arkansas, the attorney that wrote the Ferguson brief and argued 
the Ferguson case before the Arkansas Supreme Court. As a result of our efforts, we were 
able to present the arguments made in this note to the Arkansas Court of Appeals in an at-
tempt to achieve the much-needed clarification argued for in this note. 
 174. See supra Parts II.B and III.C.2 
 175. In re Estate of Edens, 2018 Ark. App. 226, 1–2, 2018 WL 1615195, at * 1–2. 
 176. Id. at 1–2, 11. 
 177. Id. at 2. 
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plained in this note,178 was that the decision in Ferguson did not expressly 
overrule prior conflicting case law and, as a result, created misunderstanding 
and misapplication of the appropriate standard for judicial recusal which is 
what happened in the lower court proceeding.179 
Unfortunately, the Arkansas Court of Appeals opted not to address 
those arguments.180 The court ruled that the trial judge should have recused 
because his “impartiality was reasonably brought into question”181 and “Rule 
2.11 required the trial court to recuse according to Ferguson.”182 Since the 
appellant was able to secure a reversal of the trial judge’s decision not to 
recuse under the even more deferential “abuse of discretion” standard, the 
appellate court did not address the remaining points relating to the conflict 
or modification of the standard of review on appeal.183 Although the court 
did not reach those arguments, it did acknowledge “these arguments are 
interesting and may even have merit.”184 That was not the clarification that 
the writers of the appeal brief hoped to secure, but the court’s statement 
nonetheless proves that, with the right set of facts on review, changes to this 
area of law can still be achieved. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After decades of navigating a legal realm of superficial existence, Fer-
guson has finally made judicial disqualification an attainable solution for 
attorneys and their clients. And while there is significant work that remains 
to be done to improve the procedural aspects of the disqualification process, 
Ferguson nonetheless takes judicial disqualification a substantial leap in the 
right direction by ending the conflict between the Code and Arkansas prece-
dent. If the momentum of Ferguson is continued, judicial disqualification 
 
 178. See supra Part III.B. 
 179. In re Estate of Edens, 2018 Ark. App. at 11, 2018 WL 1615195, at * 11. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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can be at the forefront of maintaining and promoting the public’s trust and 
confidence in the fairness of the judiciary. 
Elizabeth James* 
 
